The presence of noise in compliance times may have a critical impact on the selection of new technological standards. A technically superior standard is not necessarily viable because an arbitrarily small amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. The criterion for the viability of a standard is that the sum of "support ratios" of all players must be smaller than one, where the "support ratio" is defined as the ratio of the firm's per-period cost of supporting a standard to the per-period gross benefit that a firm receives after all players comply with the standard. * We thank Philippe Aghion,
Introduction
This paper studies the process of standard creation. We show that adding a stochastic component (noise) to standard adoption times may have a critical impact on the equilibrium standard selection. Perhaps surprisingly, in a wide range of cases a technically superior (Pareto dominant) standard may not be viable in a sense that any amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. Thus, even an infinitesimal amount of noise is not negligible. Propositions 1 and 7 show that the viability of a standard depends only on "support ratios," where "support ratio" is defined as the ratio of the firm's per-period cost of supporting the standard to the perperiod gross benefit that the firm receives when other firms comply with the standard.
Let us sketch a two-player example that illustrates the model considered herein. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two possible standards: the status quo and the new standard that Pareto dominates the status quo. At time zero both firms simultaneously choose target dates for compliance with the new standard. The actual compliance time is uncertain, it is equal to the target time plus noise. As soon as a firm is compliant with the standard, it incurs a per-period cost of supporting the standard, c. 1 Complying with the new standard starts paying off only after the standard is adopted by both firms. When (and if) this happens, each firm starts receiving a stream of net benefits at the rate d (i.e. the gross per-period benefit is c + d).
Without noise in compliance times, the game has a continuum of pure strategy equilibria: any adoption time is an equilibrium as long as both players choose that time to comply with the standard.
2 Proposition 1 shows that this multiplicity of equilibria is a knife-edge result. If there is noise in adoption times, at most two equilibria survive. There is always a trivial equilibrium where neither player ever adopts the new standard. The equilibrium where the new standard is adopted may or may not exist. Proposition 1 also establishes a necessary condition for the viability of a standard. This condition becomes necessary and sufficient as the players' discount rate con- 1 The cost of supporting a standard may take many forms. For example, hardware manufacturers who were first to put Bluetooth communication technology into their products incurred a waiting cost, because including a Bluetooth chip increases the manufacturing cost and adds no value for customers unless other Bluetooth-equipped devices are available. 2 We are assuming that new standard is Pareto dominant if when adopted it yields a positive net benefit for all players.
verges to one. Coordination on the new standard is impossible if the cost of maintaining it is more than half the gross benefit that a standard yields after adoption by both players. In other words, a standard is not viable if its support ratio, c c+d , is greater than one half. This is true for any structure of noise in the disturbance terms.
Let us sketch the intuition behind this result. First, observe that the best outcome for both players is simultaneous adoption. From the ex-post perspective, a player who complies first "wishes" he had targeted a slightly later compliance time, since that would have saved him c per period. Similarly, a player who complies last wishes he had targeted a slightly earlier compliance time because that would have saved him the gross benefit from the standard minus the cost of maintaining the standard (which is exactly equal to c for a "borderline viable" standard). Thus, roughly speaking, a standard is not viable if the benefit to the second adopter from lowering his target compliance time is smaller than the cost to the first adopter from lowering his target compliance time. In this case, first order conditions imply that each player's best response is to try to be the last one to comply with probability greater than one half-consequently the equilibrium where the new standard is adopted disappears.
The model of the standard adoption process presented in Section 3 is highly stylized-players only get benefits after everyone complies. It highlights the dramatic effects that an arbitrarily small amount of uncertainty has on the equilibrium standard selection. In a deterministic world only the net benefits from a standard matter (gross benefit minus cost of supporting a standard); in this case the support ratio is irrelevant. If, however, there is any amount of noise in compliance times, support ratios become important. These effects do not go away in a more sophisticated model where firms choose among several competing standards. Also, small amounts of noise continue to have a large impact on equilibrium selection in models where network externalities gradually increase in the number of adopters (See Section 5.2).
Related Literature
The idea that adding noise to the model may reduce the set of equilibria has a long history in economics. 4 Recently, it figures prominently in the work on global games, first introduced in Carlsson and van Damme (1993) . In global games agents receive noisy signals about the true economic fundamentals. This captures the lack of common knowledge about the true state of the economy (See Morris and Shin (2002) for the most recent survey of the global games literature).
The strand of the global games literature closest to our results is the work on synchronization games with asynchronous clocks. This work was preceded by a paper by Halpern and Moses (1990) , who show that asynchronous clocks may prevent synchronization because statements about timing never become common knowledge. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2001) show that a bubble may persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs who learn about the existence of the bubble at different times; essentially the difficulty in coordinating an attack on an asset is due to arbitrageurs' clocks not being synchronized. Morris (1995) considers a synchronization problem faced by agents who decide when to start working. Each worker knows the time on his watch but watches are not perfectly synchronized. Morris shows that if clocks are not perfectly synchronized coordination may not be achieved.
The setting of Morris's paper is very similar to ours-in both models agents gain once everybody participates but "early arrival" is costly. However, Morris (1995) model is a global game, and the inability to coordinate is due to agents having private information and thus lacking common knowledge about timing. In contrast, in our model there is no issue of clock synchronization, our agents have no private information, and the common knowledge assumption is maintained. The difficulty in coordination is due to the inability to exactly control arrival times. Thus, our model is not a global game. Nevertheless, our results share some of the remarkable features often encountered in global games, namely (1) without noise there is a continuum 4 Some equilibrium refinements are also based on the idea of perturbing a game. Trembling hand perfection is one example. However, there is a significant difference between the logic behind equilibrium refinements and global games. Both this paper and the global games literature attempt to consider games that capture some features of the underling economic reality that may play an important role in the selection of equilibrium. Unlike equilibrium refinements, we do not seek to improve the equilibrium concept, we seek to improve the model. of equilibria, adding nose to the model pins the equilibrium down; (2) there exists an equilibrium robust to noise.
5
Our results show that in a wide range of cases a technically superior (Pareto dominant) standard may not be viable in a sense that any amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. The failure of a useful standard to get adopted is a common result in the standards literature. There are many possible reasons why this may happen or why an inferior standard may prevail. They include ownership/sponsorship of standards, current technical superiority and acceptance vs. future/long-term superiority, and incompleteness of information (Katz and Shapiro 1985 , 1986 , Farrell and Saloner 1985 , Besen and Farrell 1994 , Liebowitz and Margolis 1994 .
On the other hand, this is the opposite of Farrell and Saloner (1985) conclusion that if players make adoption decisions sequentially, "a somewhat surprising result emerges: if all firms would benefit from change [to a new standard] then all will change" (p. 71). Farrell and Saloner point out that in most cases players make adoption decisions simultaneously. In that case their model has multiple equilibria. However, they show that it is an equilibrium for players to switch to the Pareto dominant standard. This result hinges on the assumption that adoption of a new standard by a firm is an instantaneous process, and thus there are no costs of imperfect coordination of adoption times. The result of Proposition 1 of our paper implies that in a simultaneous move game the Pareto efficient equilibrium considered in Farrell and Saloner (1985) may disappear if any amount of uncertainty is present. Thus, the predictions of sequential-and simultaneous-move models are very different: the adoption of the Pareto dominant standard is the unique equilibrium of the sequential-move game. In contrast, in a simultaneous-move game the adoption of the Pareto dominant standard may be impossible if any amount of uncertainty is present. In Section 5.1 we reconcile the difference by adding a dynamic aspect to the game-we make the assumption that once a firm complies with a standard, others observe that and can begin to comply as well. We then show that for a small average compliance time (i.e. as the expected compliance time goes to zero) the sequential-move game of Farrell and Saloner is a valid approximation, and the Pareto efficient outcome is an equilibrium. On the other hand, for a large average compliance time (i.e. as the expected compliance time goes to infinity) the simultaneous-move model considered herein is a valid approximation.
The Model
We start with a simple model where complying with a standard is only profitable if every other firm complies as well. This simple model is sufficient to illustrate the importance of noise in the process of standard adoption and creation. In Section 5.2 we will consider a more general model of network externalities. The key assumption of our model is that each firm can select the target time by which it expects to become compliant with a new standard. The actual compliance time, however, is uncertain-it is equal to the target compliance time plus a disturbance term. The random disturbances are uncorrelated across firms, and thus perfect coordination is impossible-some firms are bound to comply earlier than others. While a firm is waiting for others to comply, it bears waiting costs. It only gets benefits after everyone (or, in a more general model, a sufficient number of other firms) complies.
More formally, suppose there are N firms that consider adopting a new standard. Each firm can choose a target compliance time µ i ≥ m i at which it plans to comply with the standard (m i is an exogenous constraint-for each firm there is some minimum time required to comply), or a firm can choose not to comply at all, which we denote by out. All firms select their target times simultaneously. If the firm decides not to comply, its payoff is 0. Otherwise, its actual compliance time t i is equal to µ i plus a random disturbance drawn from continuous probability distribution F i independent of other firms' disturbances. As soon as a firm complies with the new standard, it has to pay a cost of supporting it of c i per period. When (and if!) all firms adopt the standard, firm i starts getting a flow of net benefits d i (i.e. the per-period gross benefit is c i + d i ). The adoption time, i.e. the time when all firms comply, is denoted by t * = max i {t i } (if one of the agents never adopts, we say that t * = ∞). For simplicity, we assume that c i and d i do not change over time. The firm's payoff is a discounted flow of costs and benefits from the new standard:
, where π i (t) is the sum of cost and gross benefit accrued at time t,
Assume that the discount factor, β, is strictly less than 1. We will refer to the game described above as Γ(β).
To analyze the equilibria of Γ(β), we construct an approximation with no time discounting. To be able to do that, we renormalize payoffs, and for each i subtract the net benefit after universal adoption, d i , from firm i's instantaneous payoff in every period, i.e.
More precisely, define Γ(1) as follows. Action space and probability distributions of disturbances are the same as before, but payoffs are different. If a player chooses out, his payoff is u out 6 . If player i chooses some target compliance time and another player chooses out, player i's payoff is −∞. If all players choose to comply, the payoff of player i is given by the expected value of −c i (t * − t i ) − d i t * , where t * = max i {t i }, and vector t is equal to vector µ plus random vector of disturbances drawn from continuous probability distribution F 1 × · · · × F N . We also define the support ratio of firm i,
per-period net benefit received by firm i after all firms comply β time discount factor u out in Γ(1), payoff of a firm which decides not to comply t * max i {t i } , i.e. the adoption time s i support ratio of firm i, it equals c i c i +d i 6 u out is assumed to be "sufficiently" low. The exact definition will be made clear in the next section.
The Viability of a Standard
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium set of Γ(β) as β → 1. It gives a criterion of the viability of a standard, i.e. a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium where the standard is adopted provided that players are sufficiently patient. If the sum of support ratios of all players is less then one, a standard is viable. This condition does not depend on the distribution of noise-it only depends on the firms' support ratios. Also, it says that as β increases, equilibrium target compliance times decrease, i.e. as players become more patient, they adopt earlier.
there exists β 0 < 1 such that for any β 0 < β < 1 game Γ(β) has exactly two equilibria-one in which all players choose to adopt, and one in which all players choose not to adopt
, where µ * (·) denotes the vector of target compliance times in the equilibrium where the standard is adopted (iii) for any
, then there exists β 0 < 1 such that for any β 0 < β < 1 game Γ(β) has only one equilibrium, and in that equilibrium all players choose not to adopt.
We prove this proposition in two steps.
Step 1 is to characterize the equilibria of the game with no time discounting, Γ(1)-this is done in Proposition 4.
Step 2 is to show that equilibria of Γ(β) converge to those of Γ(1) as β → 1.
Step 1. First, we prove two auxiliary results.
Lemma 2 Suppose players have distributions of disturbances {F i }. Take any strictly positive numbers {p i } such that p i = 1. Then there exists a vector of target times such that each player i adopts last with probability p i .
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 Suppose players have distributions of disturbances {F i }. Take any strictly positive numbers {p i } such that p i ≤ 1. Take any numbers {m i }. Then there exists a vector of target times, µ, such that (i) for all i, µ i ≥ m i , (ii) each player i adopts last with probability greater than or equal to p i , and (iii) if µ i > m i , player i adopts last with probability exactly equal to p i . If p i < 1, such vector µ is unique.
Proof. See Appendix. Now we can state the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium of Γ(1) where firms choose to adopt. Such equilibrium exists if and only if the sum of the probabilities with which players want to be last is less than or equal to one.
Proposition 4
and when the above inequality is strict, such equilibrium is unique. Also, there is only one other equilibrium-all players choose out. Proof. First, notice that if in an equilibrium at least one player plays out with a positive probability, all of them have to play out with probability 1 (to get u out instead of −∞). Therefore, "all out" is an equilibrium and in all other equilibria (if they exist) players have to mix among target times and never play out.
Suppose player i takes the distribution of adoption times of other players as given. Then, in his personal optimum, he will choose his adoption time µ i in such a way that either µ i = m i and the probability of him being last is q i ≥ s i or µ i > m i and the probability of him being last is q i = s i . (To see that, suppose that µ i > m i and the probability of him being last is q i > c i /(c i + d i ). If instead he plans to adopt slightly earlier, at µ i − , in expectation he gains
2 ) (when he is the last one to adopt) and
2 ) (when he is not). For µ i to be optimal, it has to be the case that
If the sum of these "desired" probabilities s i is greater than one, then, since each player wants to adopt last with at least his "desired" probability, no µ can satisfy these conditions. When s i ≤ 1, by Lemma 3, such µ exists and hence it is an equilibrium provided that each player's expected payoff is greater than u out . When the inequality is strict, uniqueness also follows directly from Lemma 3.
Step 2. The proof that equilibria of Γ(β) converge to those of Γ(1) as β → 1 is rather technical, and we present it in the Appendix. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Note that it is clear from the proof that if inequality (1) is strict, then in the equilibrium where the standard is adopted some firms comply as soon as they can, while for the rest the probability of being last is equal to the support ratio.
Extensions
In this section we show that the results of Section 4 are robust. First, we allow firms to observe the compliance times of others, thus letting them condition their compliance decisions on the information that arrives dynamically. Second, we consider a general form of network externalities.
The Observability of Compliance Times
In Section 4 we showed that in a wide range of cases a technically superior standard may not be viable. This is the opposite of Farrell and Saloner (1985) conclusion that if players make adoption decisions sequentially, then a Pareto superior standard gets adopted in equilibrium. In this section we reconcile the difference by adding a dynamic aspect to the game-we make an assumption that once a firm complies with a standard, others observe that and can begin to comply as well. Proposition 5 shows that for small average compliance times (i.e. as the expected compliance time goes to zero) the sequential-move game of Farrell and Saloner is a valid approximation, and the Pareto efficient outcome is an equilibrium. On the other hand, for large average compliance times (i.e. as the expected compliance time goes to infinity), the simultaneous-move model is a valid approximation (Proposition 6).
Assume that at each time t a firm can initiate the compliance process if it has not already. Once initiated, the process takes an uncertain amount of time. Denote the expected amount of time it takes firm i to comply by T i ; the actual compliance time (if the firm initiated the process at time t) is thus t + T i + i , where i is a random deviation. We assume that distributions of random deviations are bounded for all players and independent of each other. Define T min = min i {T i + i } and T max = max i {T i + i }, where i and i are the lower and the upper bounds of stochastic deviations i of firm i. In other words, T min is the shortest amount of time it takes any firm to comply, and T max is the longest amount of time it takes any firm to comply once it has initiated the compliance process. Once a firm has initiated the process, it cannot reverse it or influence the time it is going to take.
Each firm observes when others comply, i.e. at time t each firm knows who has complied prior to time t and when they did it. However, it does not know who has initiated the compliance process. We also assume that the discount rate β < 1 is held constant. Then the following propositions hold.
Proposition 5
If the new standard is strictly Pareto optimal, then as T max → 0, equilibrium payoffs of the players approach the payoffs they would obtain if each firm immediately decided to comply with the standard. Proof. See Appendix. Now consider a family of games with observable compliance times where all players' expected initiation-to-compliance times T i are increased by the same x ≥ 0, while holding the distributions of disturbances the same. Notice that without observable compliance times all these games are identical, up to multiplying all players' payoffs by β x , and thus we can without ambiguity talk about the corresponding simultaneous-move game without observable times.
Proposition 6 As x → ∞, the game with observable compliance times has an equilibrium where the standard is adopted if and only if there exists an equilibrium of the corresponding simultaneous-move game where the standard is adopted.
Network Externalities
Up to this point we assumed a very specific form of network externalities. We now show how our results can be extended to network externalities of a general form. We continue to assume that there are N players who choose their target compliance times and whose actual compliance times are independent stochastic deviations from their targets. We also assume that all players are identical. Firms bear per-period cost c after they comply. The per-period net benefit of a firm that has complied with the standard is now d(k) (i.e. the gross benefit is c + d(k)), where k is the number of firms that have complied up to that moment, including itself; k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }. We assume that d(N ) > 0, i.e. the new standard is profitable if everyone adopts it, and that d(k) is weakly increasing in k.
Then the following result holds.
Proposition 7
For sufficiently patient players, there exists an equilibrium where the new standard is adopted if and only if
Proof. We omit the approximation part of the proof, since it is completely analogous to Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 1, and we go directly to the case with no discounting. Notice that since players are identical, in the equilibrium where they comply they have to target the same time. Therefore, for a given firm, its probability of being the kth firm to comply is equal to 1 N for any k. Therefore, its expected net benefit from delaying its compliance by a small amount of time is proportional to c − = 1. Then in the game with no discounting players do not want to deviate if all target the same compliance times. In the presence of any nontrivial discounting, however, a player's higher benefits are discounted at a higher rate, since they on average happen when he complies later, and therefore he would be strictly better off by deviating by a small amount.
The proposition states that a standard can be adopted in equilibrium if and only if the average of inverse support ratios (
) is greater than one. From symmetry, it follows that in equilibrium each player has the same probability of complying first, last, or anything in between. Thus, the condition simply states that in expectation, the flow of benefits at the time of compliance is greater than the flow of costs of maintaining a standard. If that were false, a player would prefer to comply later.
The following corollary of Proposition 7 reflects the fact that the free rider problem does not become more severe if the number of players in the standard adoption game is increased.
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Corollary 8 Consider two games with different numbers of players but identical costs c and identical network externalities d(k). If a standard can be adopted in an equilibrium of a game that has N players, then it can be adopted in a game that has more than N players.
Throughout the paper we refer to players as firms, because results of Section 4 are relevant for standard adoption games where the number of participants is small and each participant may be pivotal (players are a handful of corporations). The results of the present section are also relevant for standards that can only succeed if adopted by millions of consumers or other small players, even though there is no longer any uncertainty about the share of players who have complied at any given moment. The following corollary makes this claim formal. Assume that there is a continuum of identical players. Let D(α) denote the per-period net benefit to a player who is compliant with the new standard at the time when share α of the population of players is compliant; as before, the support ratio is S(α) = 
Discussion
Our results imply some interesting corollaries. First, they say that a Pareto improving standard is not necessarily viable. The following quotation from the Court's Findings of Fact in the U.S. v. Microsfot case gives a very similar argument:
41. In deciding whether to develop an application for a new operating system, an [Independent Software Vendor's] first consideration is the number of users it expects the operating system to attract. Out of this focus arises a collective-action problem: Each ISV realizes that the new operating system could attract a significant number of users if enough ISVs developed applications for it; but few ISVs want to sink resources into developing for the system until it becomes established. Since everyone is waiting for everyone else to bear the risk of early adoption, the new operating system has difficulty attracting enough applications to generate a positive feedback loop.
11
Another setting where our results apply is the creation of standards by various industry groups. We can view this process as a two-stage game. First, an industry consortium develops and recommends a single standard out of a large universe of technically feasible standards. Then each player decides if and when to adopt a standard recommendation. The subgame is modeled as a standard adoption game considered earlier. The objective of the consortium is to select a Pareto improving standard that maximizes the total payoff of the industry participants.
12 This objective implies that the consortium will always choose to recommend a viable standard, whenever a viable standard is available. Thus, the equilibrium recommendation of the consortium may be Pareto dominated by some technologically feasible standard.
A disclaimer is in order: it is not our contention that noise in adoption terms determines the outcome of a battle among competing standards. However, looking at support ratios may offer an insight into competition among standards: for a standard to survive and be backed by some coalition of players it has to be the case that its support ratios are sufficiently low. 11 The document goes on to say that "the vendor of a new operating system cannot effectively solve this problem by paying the necessary number of ISVs to write for its operating system, because the cost of doing so would dwarf the expected return." We disagree with this claim-in our opinion, the reason for the operating system vendor's inability to pay the ISVs has to do with complications inherent in writing and enforcing the necessary contracts.
12 Nothing would change if the objective function of the consortium is to maximize some objective function that is increasing in the profit of each player. 
A Proofs of Section 4 Lemmas

A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Let f (µ) = |q i − p i |, where µ is a vector of target compliance times and q i is the probability that player i complies last. Take µ * which minimizes f . Suppose f (µ) > 0. Then there exists i such that q * i > p i . Reduce µ i slightly (call the new vector µ ) so that the new q i is between p i and q * i .
Notice that for all j = i, q j ≥ q * j and for at least one j, p j ≥ q j . Hence,
. Contradiction. Notice that we assumed that the minimizing µ * exists. When all distributions are bounded, this assumption is justified by the fact that we can restrict µ to, say, a set of vectors in which µ 1 = 0 and all other µ j are bounded by the sum of the sizes of supports of all N distributions of disturbances. When some distributions are not bounded, we make use of our assumption that all p i are positive. We can choose > 0, 2 < min(p i ) and approximate unbounded distributions by bounded ones so that for all µ the difference between f (µ) for the unbounded distributions and their bounded approximations is less than . Then there exists µ * * such that f bounded approximation (µ * * ) = 0, and then arg min f (µ) exists and belongs to the compact set {µ|µ 1 = 0, f bounded approximation (µ) ≤ 2 }.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Consider set T = {µ|∀i, µ i ≥ m i , q i (µ) ≥ p i }, where q i (µ) is the probability that player i complies last given that players choose target times µ. Take µ * ∈ T which minimizes i µ i in T . Then µ * satisfies the conditions of the lemma. Indeed, for all i, q i ≥ p i , and we only need to show that for all i µ i > m i implies q i = p i . Suppose that is not so. Take i such that q i > p i and µ i > m i . We can slightly decrease µ i so that it is still greater than m i and q i is still greater than p i , i.e. the modifies µ is still in T . But we decreased i µ i -contradiction! Of course, it is necessary to prove that such minimizing µ exists. To show that, first notice that set T is not empty as, according to Lemma 2, there exists µ * * such that q 1 (µ * * ) = 1 − p 2 − · · · − p N and q i (µ * * ) = p i for i > 1. Second, notice that we can search for µ * in the intersection of sets T and {µ|µ i ≥ m i , µ i ≤ µ * * i }. The latter set is compact, the former is closed, and so their intersection is compact and, since function µ i is continuous in µ, there exist µ * in that set which minimizes this function. When p i < 1, such vector has to be unique: if there are two vectors (µ 1 , µ 2 ) satisfying the conditions, take player i with the biggest increase in µ i from µ 1 to µ 2 ; then both q i (µ 2 ) > p i and µ 2 i > m i -contradiction.
B Proof of Proposition 1-Step 2
For simplicity, assume that distributions of disturbances F i are bounded.
(i) Clearly, the strategy vector where nobody complies is an equilibrium. Let's show that for β sufficiently close to 1, there exists exactly one other pure equilibrium, and no mixed ones. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.
Take a Nash Equilibrium in which player i chooses compliance time µ i with positive probability. For convenience, if player j chooses not to comply, let t j = ∞ and t j > t i . By the same "marginal delay" reasoning as in Proposition 4, Player i's FOC for choosing µ i is
to both sides, we get the equivalent FOC
Crucially, the ratio of the right-hand side over the left-hand side goes up if µ i goes up, unless all other players choose not to comply, and so one and only one point on the real line can satisfy this condition. This rules out mixing among compliance times.
Letq i (µ, β) be equal to
Let t * i be such that (c i +d i )P rob(t * i = last)−c i = 0. The integrand is negative for t i < t * i and positive for t i > t * i . β 2 > β 1 , and so
is an increasing function. Therefore,
But this, together with µ 2 > µ 1 ≥ m i , is a violation of the FOC for an equilibrium.
(iv) To prove the last statement, assume the opposite. Then there is a sequence {β n } converging to 1 from above such that for each β n there is an equilibrium where players choose to comply. Then there is a subsequence {β k } such that µ * (β k ) converges to someμ. But then by continuity,μ satisfies the FOC with β = 1 and is therefore an equilibrium of game Γ(1). But we know that Γ(1) does not have an equilibrium where players comply.
C Proofs of Section 5.1 Propositions C.1 Proof of Proposition 5
We prove the statement by induction on N , the number of players. For N = 1 the statement is obvious. Suppose it holds for N = k, let's show that it also holds for N = k +1. Suppose there is a sequence of equilibria for T max → 0 in which the payoffs of players converge to something other than the payoffs of the Pareto-efficient outcome (i.e. the immediate adoption of the standard). Take any player i whose equilibrium payoff in the limit is strictly less than his payoff under the immediate adoption. If he deviates from his equilibrium strategy, and initiates the compliance process immediately, then others will observe that he has complied at most after T max . After that we are back in the game with N − 1 players, which, by the assumption of induction, has equilibria payoffs arbitrarily close to Pareto optimal ones as T max goes to 0. But then player i's payoff from deviating is less than the Pareto payoff by at most the costs and foregone profits up to T max plus the costs and foregone profits while the (N − 1)-player subgame takes place. But each of these two components goes to zero as T max goes to zero, and so player i's payoff from deviating goes to his Pareto payoff-thus any equilibrium payoff has to approach the Pareto payoff as well.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose the simultaneous-move game has an equilibrium where the standard is adopted. Let x be such that min i {T i + x + i } is greater than max i {T i + i }. Then the equilibrium with adoption of the simultaneous-move game remains an equilibrium of the game with observable compliance time, since the optimal target compliance times are such that players want to initiate the compliance process before they could have possibly observed other players' compliance.
On the other hand, suppose the simultaneous-move game does not have an equilibrium where the standard is adopted, but for arbitrarily large x the game with observable compliance times does. Notice that in an equilibrium with adoption, for a large enough x, each player (say, player 1) has to initiate the compliance process before observing others comply with a positive probability (otherwise the payoff of at least one of the other players is negative, as player 1 always complies too late). Let µ i (x) denote the earliest target compliance time of player i in an equilibrium with delay x; subtract µ 1 (x) from all µ i (x)s to normalize. Now consider the sequence of vectors µ(x) as x goes to infinity. This sequence has to be bounded-otherwise the player with the lowest µ i (x) would find it profitable to deviate and not comply at all. Thus, it has to converge to some vector µ. By assumption, there were no equilibria with compliance in the simultaneous-move game, and thus there is at least one player who would find it strictly profitable to slightly increase his target compliance time if everyone targeted µ. But then, for a large enough x, this player would also find it profitable to do that in the observable-compliance game with delay x.
